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ARGUMENT 
1. THE SENTENCING HEARING ON MAY 23, 1995, WAS A CRITICAL 
STAGE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDING DURING WHICH 
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
In its Brief, the State argues that because Defendant was not 
"sentenced" at the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the hearing did 
not constitute a "critical stage" in the criminal proceeding. In the 
process, the State acknowledges that, "arguably, it would have been 
easy and preferable for the court to continue the [May 23, 1995] 
hearing simply to have conflict counsel present . . . ." (Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 10 and 12). 
As a matter of well-settled law, "[s]entencing is a critical 
stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to 
the effective assistance of counsel." State v. Caserez, 656 P. 2d 
1005, 1007 (Utah 1982) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 
254 (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209 (1967); 
and Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 756, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948)). 
Procedural fairness is an obligatory at the sentencing phase of a 
trial as at the guilt phase." Id. (citing Presnell v. Georgia, 439 
U.S. 14, 16, 99 S.Ct. 235, 236 (1978)). Further, the right to 
assistance of counsel "is personal in nature and may be waived by a 
competent accused [only] if the waiver is ^knowingly and 
intelligently' made." State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 92 S.Ct. 
4 
2006, 2012 (1972); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65, 58 S. Ct. 
1019, 1023 (1938); State v. Ruple, 631 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Utah 1981); 
State v. Wilson, 563 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Utah 1977). A knowing and 
intelligent waiver is required because xx [w] hen an accused manages 
[her] own defense, [s]he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, 
many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to 
counsel." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 
2541 (1975). Furthermore, the violation of the constitutional right 
to counsel cannot be considered harmless error. See State v. 
Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894, 898 n.4 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Sampson, 
808 P.2d 1100, 1109 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991), cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282 (1992); Cf. 
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n.8 
(1984) ("Since the right of self-representation is a right that when 
exercised usually increases the likelihood of a trial outcome 
unfavorable to the defendant, its denial is not amenable to "harmless 
error" analysis. The right is either respected or denied; its 
deprivation cannot be harmless"). 
That the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing was a critical stage 
in the criminal proceeding against Defendant is evidenced not only by 
the fact that the hearing was part and parcel of the sentencing 
proceedings, as a whole, but by the trial court's own terminology 
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utilized during the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing and the 
subsequent Order for 60 Day Evaluation. After granting the oral 
motion of Defendant's appointed counsel to withdraw as counsel at the 
May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing, the following exchange between the 
trial court and Defendant took place: 
THE COURT: Ms. Martinez, this is the time set for 
sentencing. The recommendation is that you be 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison five years to life. 
I believe that I do need more information and what I'm 
proposing is sentence [sic] you to the Department of 
Corrections for a 60-day evaluation. In the 
evaluation they determine your background and make a 
recommendation if you should -- if I should follow the 
recommendation or that you should be in some 
alternative program. 
MS. MARTINEZ [DEFENDANT]: Do I have to go to jail 
today? 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MS. MARTINEZ: You can't give me a couple of days to 
get things straightened out with my children, get 
things put away? 
THE COURT: No, and the circumstances I'm concerned 
about, whether you'd be there --. 
MS. MARTINEZ: I also have --my mother is also dying. 
They don't give her very much time to live. I'll be 
back. I'll do my time. I know I did a crime. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm really concerned about potential 
risk of not being there, given the circumstances and 
therefore, I'm going to order you --. 
MR. CAMPAS: Your Honor --
THE COURT: State you name. 
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MR. CAMPAS: Edward Campas. I'm her brother. And 
your Honor, I'm the one who told her to file the 
grievance against Mr. Albright because he has been 
prejudiced against this. He has asked -- she has 
asked him not to represent her. 
MR. ALBRIGHT: Then she went ahead and had me 
represent her. I object to him bringing anything up 
that's not been filed with the court at this time. 
The court has nothing to do with that. 
THE COURT: If you want to address the issue of 
sentencing, that's the issue. 
MR. CAMPAS: I will guarantee she'll come back. 
THE COURT: Well, if she comes back you are going to 
have I think circumstances. . . . 
(R. 46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing) (Emphasis 
Added). That same day, the trial court signed an Order for the 60 
Day Evaluation, which states in relevant part: 
This matter came before the Court for 
pronouncement of sentence on May 23, 1995. 
Plaintiff appeared by through Carvel R. Harward, 
county Attorney for Davis County. Defendant 
appeared in person and by his attorney, Don Redd 
[sic]. . . -1 
There being no legal reason presented to 
the Court why judgment should not be pronounced, 
and it appearing to the Court that imprisonment 
may be appropriate in this case, but more 
xThe confusion surrounding the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing 
is further evidenced by the trial court's statement in the Order that 
Defendant appeared at the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing "by his 
[sic] attorney, Don Redd [sic]" when Defendant, contrary to the 
court's Order, actually appeared pro se after the trial court granted 
her appointed counsel's oral motion to withdraw as counsel (see R. 
46-51, Transcript of May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing). 
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detailed information is desirable as a basis for 
determining the final sentence, than has been 
provided by a presentence report.... 
(R. 22, Order for 60 Day Evaluation) (Emphasis Added). 
At page 10 of its Brief, the State argues that " [i]f the May 
[sentencing] hearing at issue here had involved the pronouncement and 
imposition of defendant's sentence, this Court would be faced with a 
"
l
 cri tical stage at wiii ch tl le absence of coin isel generally would 
constitute error not subject to a harmlessness analysis." Such an 
assertion is not supported by direct authority, rather it is contrary 
* *1 e s S n • :- n, e C o i I r t c a s e 1! a w, \ J 1 i e i e , :i i I [ In i t e d S t a t e s v J 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S... Ct. 1926 (1967), the Court defined a 
" .::..-.::a- stage" as a stage "where the results might well settle the 
accused's fate . . . ." (Emphasis added.) J.U. at 224, 87 S. Ct. At 
1931. The distinction of whether the sentence is actually pronounced 
DI : :i i riposecii i ip : i i tl i B defendant c .t sentei I ::il ng |: ] : : motes f :)i: n: i over 
substance, especially when the constitutional right to the assistance 
of counsel is involved.2 
Finally, the State argues in its Brief that there was no p u r p 0 s e 
served by having counsel represent Defendant at the May 23, 1995, 
S e n t: e n c i n g He a r i ng, a i i d t h a t "the o n 1 y t: h i i ig • i o n e . :i I ti h a I I. .i"' " 11 e a i i n g 
2The State's characterization of the May 23, 1995, Sentencing 
Hearing as being merely "preparatory" to sentencing is also contrary 
to the previously cited United States Supreme Court case law for the 
same reasons. 
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in conflict counsel's absence was the preparatory step of submitting 
defendant for the 60-day diagnostic evaluation . . . ." The State, 
however, fails to recognize that at the point where the trial court, 
after depriving Defendant of her right to the assistance of counsel, 
expressed its inclination to commit Defendant to prison, effective 
counsel could have marshaled commendations and arguments in 
mitigation of the impending sentence. Such commendations and 
arguments in mitigation of incarceration include Defendant's total 
lack of involvement in the juvenile system (see Presentence 
Investigation Report, p. 5), Defendant's relatively recent 
involvement in the criminal justice system, which also indicates that 
Defendant does not present a danger to society (see Presentence 
Investigation Report, p. 6) , and collateral comments from sources 
close to Defendant that she is a "very good mother" with a problem 
centered around alcohol and drug abuse (see Presentence Investigation 
Report, pp. 10-11). The trial court's failure to allow Defendant to 
be represented by counsel at the remainder of the hearing or to 
obtain a valid waiver of the right to counsel also prejudiced 
Defendant by preventing her, as a pro se criminal litigant, from a 
full and fair opportunity to challenge any discrepancies in the 
Presentence Investigation Report as she is entitled to pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) . See Kuehnert v. Turner, 499 P.2d 
9 
839, 840-41 (Utah 1972). Furthermore, the State's assertions that 
the representation of counsel at the May 23, 1995, Sentencing Hearing 
served no purpose is, at most, speculative at this point of the 
proceedings. 
All the more troubling in this case is t:l: le t:i :i a] court's 
complete failure, after requiring Defendant to appear pro se at the 
r erna indei: :)f the Sentencii ig Heai ii ig, t:c: obtai i i a > a ] id waiver of the 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. The significance 
of the trial court's failure to obtain a waiver in the instant case 
is underscored I'/ 1 le* I'VIS^, Kuehnert i, Twiner, 4"'^> P , 2d 839 (Utah 
1972), which the State cites in its Brief. In Kuehnert, the Utah 
Supreme Court, in the process of remanding the case for resentencing 
due to the absence of counsel and waiver of the right to counsel, 
noted that because the record did not indicate knowingly and 
• • - . . ; - a :i ^  n;e i : f tl le rigl: it •.---. *....- _'. . . //as 
"compelled" to hold the sentence "invalid."' Id. at 841. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S SENTENCING OF DEFENDANT WAS 
INHERENTLY UNFAIR BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
CONSIDER LEGALLY RELEVANT FACTORS AND FAILED TO 
RESOLVE INACCURACIES IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION 
REPORT IN THE COURSE OF SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
The State argues in its Brief that "Defendant does not establish 
I 
that the court's memory of Parkview's program was erroneous in any 
i: espect . . . ." (Brief M] , \ppellee, p. 2 3 ) . This is inaccurate 
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because on pages 25-28 of Defendant's Brief, Defendant establishes 
that the trial court failed to consider and clarify whether the 
Parkview alternative treatment program met the qualifications for a 
long term program pursuant to he recommendation of the Department of 
Corrections (see also R. 65-67, Transcript of July 25, 1995, 
Sentencing Hearing). 
Contrary to the State's assertion that the matter concerning the 
discrepancies in the Presentence Investigation Report was not 
preserved below, trial counsel specifically brought the discrepancies 
to the trial court's attention. At that point in time, the trial 
court had a responsibility pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a) 
to resolve the discrepancies in the manner set forth in the statute, 
which it failed to do. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that the 
Court vacate her sentence and remand the case for resentencing so 
that Defendant might have the opportunity to be represented by 
counsel during sentencing and so the trial court might consider all 
legally relevant factors in the course of imposing sentence. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument inasmuch as c > i al argi inient will 
materially enhance the decisional process due : the complex and 
significant issues in the instant
 app e a sealing with the 
constitutional right to the right to the assistance of counsel, which 
is a matter of continuing public interest, and which case involves 
issues i r^ quir \ n 4 l1|irther v^eloprnenit n ^n 1 ii - I nuinil law. 
Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of disposition 
of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the Court "For 
Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value to aid 
defense counsel In the areas of sentencing as a critical stage in the 
• 1 i. n a I p r o c e e d i n g. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of May, 1996. 
H6LMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C. 
sEoit^L 
Defendants for Defendant 
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